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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is twofold: to analyze to what extent innovation output of R&D 
collaborations, proxied by co-patenting activities in terms of quantity, characteristics and value, 
differs depending on whether the engaged R&D partners have a certain type of relationship (allies, 
suppliers and subsidiaries); to identify possible automakers co-patenting patterns taking into 
account the differences in the innovation output with their R&D partners. 
Design/methodology/approach – To reach the aims, the authors matched two types of data: co-
assigned patent portfolio of four automakers and relationship type between automakers and their 
co-assignees. Matching the company names of the two data sources allowed the authors to obtain 
the final data set used to carry out extensive descriptive and regression analysis, both on a firm- and 
patent-level. 
Findings – Results show differences in the characteristics and the technological value of patented 
inventions in relation with the type of collaboration partner; they also support the authors in the 
identification of four co-patenting patterns (contingent, purposive, watchful and advanced) 
according to the co-patenting propensity and the presence of a preferred relationship type. 
Originality/value – The paper contributes to the literature by investigating the presence of 
differences across the patenting activities of a selection of automakers and their supplier, allied and 
subsidiary firms. The issue related to patent value represents an emerging area of interest in the 
field of collaborations for innovation. The methodology constitutes a novelty by matching two 
different sources and standardizing the company names (“name game”) through an automated 
algorithm and a double manual check, by searching company web sites and corporate trees. 
 
Keywords Alliances, Automotive, Suppliers, Co-patenting, R&D collaboration 
1 Introduction 
In contexts characterized by increasing competition, innovation has turned out to be a 
collaborative activity and firms rely extensively on their environment to exploit much of their 
innovation advantage (Fawcett et al., 2012). On these grounds, the issue of how to manage the 
knowledge flow in and out of a company has become a major corporate concern (Choi et al., 2004) 
and R&D collaboration has been given increasing attention by researchers (Lin et al., 2011). In this 
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field, the literature has mainly focused on ‘why to cooperate’ and ‘with whom’ (Schwartz et al, 
2012), as well as on the impact of (different types of) R&D collaboration on firm performance 
(Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2012), both in terms of innovation output and economic output. 
Within this context, it is widely recognized that patents are among the most important outcomes of 
R&D (Laursen and Salter, 2006), overall in small-scale inter-firm R&D collaboration where companies 
are unable to divide the inventions among the partners (Hagedoorn, 2003). Similarly, when R&D 
outputs have the potential to become a core competency for one partner and when a substantial 
risk exists that the other partner could abuse individually-owned intellectual property (IP) for 
strategic reasons, the concerned partner is likely to prefer joint IP rights to splitting the ownership in 
two. Despite studies stress the disadvantages of co-patenting and specialists argue that companies 
still see joint patents as a second-best option with respect to single patents, they also recognize that 
companies have learned how to deal with joint patenting and their reluctance to co-own patents has 
gradually decreased (Hagedoorn, 2003). Moreover, co-ownership of IP not only has received 
particular attention from scholars but also remains an empirically relevant strategy for companies 
developing technology jointly (Belderbos et al., 2014). Hence, this instrument has assumed 
increasing importance in R&D collaborations, also because in many different high-tech industries 
interdependencies between the various components of a process leading to a product are frequent 
and it is therefore more difficult to claim for different patents. 
While acknowledging that co-patents are not the only outcome of R&D collaboration, we 
base on the above-discussed considerations in order to argue that patents could be exploited as 
data source for the investigation of co-patenting strategies and the value of R&D collaboration 
output [1].On these grounds, this paper aims to provide answers to the following research 
questions: i) considering the co-owned inventions of the firms in the automotive industry, , a 
typically complex technical environment relying on the cooperation in knowledge creation (Lin and 
Cao, 2012), which are the differences among the diverse types of R&D co-assignees (i.e. allied, 
supplier and subsidiary firms) in terms of patent characteristics and value? ; ii) in particular, can 
different co-patenting patterns be identified according to the type of relationship between 
automakers and their R&D partners? 
To reach our aim, we combined both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Four 
global-scale automakers were selected and for each of them we identified both the portfolio of 
relationships with allied, supplier and subsidiary companies and the portfolio of patented inventions 
co-owned with other firms. 
Results firstly show that co-patents with different R&D partners have different 
characteristics and value. Particularly, the co-owned innovations are on average more complex, are 
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associated to a wider technological scope and cover technological fields which are more often 
different from the core activities of the examined firms than the single-owned inventions. Some of 
these peculiarities are not consistent when considering the different types of relationships of the 
focal firm: complexity seems to be associated in particular to the inventions co-owned with a 
supplier or trough non-formalized collaborations; the technological scope is mostly a characteristic 
of the inventions co-assigned with subsidiaries; the ability to innovate in technology fields different 
from the core domain of the examined automakers is particularly associated to the collaborations 
with subsidiaries and to the non-formalized ones. The inventions jointly patented with an allied firm 
seem to differ from single-owned for the size of the inventors’ team only. 
Furthermore, taking into account such ex-ante differences, the technological relevance of 
the patented inventions is higher when the co-assignee is either a supplier or a subsidiary. These 
results seem associated to the fact that firms might be more able to generate valuable innovations 
collaborating with partners with a tighter relationship correspondent either to the direct ownership 
or the existence of a solid supply contract, while co-patented inventions deriving from alliances, that 
is the R&D collaboration output, may be required by the alliance agreement. 
Secondly, the selected companies seem to have different co-patenting strategies not only in 
terms of propensity to co-patenting but also in terms of relatively most frequent type of partners 
and of level of concentration of the co-owned patented inventions with them. We argue that co-
patenting strategies can be thus distinguished along the categories contingent, purposive, watchful 
and extensive according to the co-patenting propensity and the presence of a preferred co-
patenting relationship type, i.e. allies, suppliers or subsidiaries. 
The remainder of the paper is divided in four sections: firstly, a literature overview on R&D 
collaborations and involved partners is outlined in order to contextualize the research questions; 
secondly, the methodology is described in deep details before presenting data analysis and results; 
lastly, results are discusses in order to draw the conclusions and open new paths for future research. 
 
2 Theoretical background 
2.1 R&D collaboration and co-patenting 
Technological innovation has been the driving force for evolution in many industries. The 
success or failure of a firm’s R&D activities often has serious implications for its overall performance 
(Teng, 2007), hence firms have allocated increasing resources to R&D to speed up the pace of 
innovation and diversify their technological capabilities (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). One of the 
most successful and widely employed approaches has been a cooperative strategy. Within this 
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context, Chesbrough (2003) suggests that many innovative firms have shifted to an ‘open 
innovation’ model, using a wide range of external actors and sources to help them achieve and 
sustain innovation. This concept redefines the boundary between the firm and its surrounding 
environment, making the firm more porous and embedded in loosely coupled networks of different 
actors, collectively and individually working toward commercializing new knowledge (Laursen and 
Salter, 2006). In particular, joint R&D is one of the most significant drivers towards collaboration in 
medium and high-tech industries. Tether (2002) illustrates that R&D collaborations have a long 
history and they received considerable theoretical and empirical attention during the 1980s and 
1990s when authors started to talk about strategic technology alliances, collaborative arrangements 
for R&D, and innovation networks. 
Scientific literature on the theme of R&D collaborations has developed along two main 
streams of research: the former concerns the various motives that spur firms to collaborate on R&D 
(e.g. Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Tether, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004a) and the latter studies the effects 
of (different types of) R&D cooperation on firm performance (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2004a,b; 
Gnyawali and Park, 2011). In particular, a variety of reasons are given in the literature for the 
apparent growth in innovation and technology alliances: to overcome firm individual limitations in 
R&D capabilities and enhancement of their R&D success rate, as well as to jointly endorse R&D 
outputs, which creates a network externality effect that increases the innovations’ chance for 
market acceptance (Teng, 2007), and reduce the risks associated with innovation, including the risk 
of technological spillovers (Tether, 2002). Concerning the second stream of literature, firm 
performance may refer to the generation of new innovation or to the associated economic returns. 
The latter are measured in terms of sales, employment growth and firms labor productivity (e.g. 
Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001; Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Faems et al., 2005). The former is related 
to the increase of firm capabilities in terms of new product development, R&D project performance, 
technological advances and patent productivity (e.g. Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Gnyawali and 
Park, 2011; Sampson, 2005). Reminding that there is a well-established relationship between R&D 
and patents (see Griliches, 1998), and patents are among the most important outcomes of R&D 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006), we expect an association between the joint R&D efforts of firms and 
joint patenting, our unit of analysis. 
A co-patent is a patent owned by two or more assignees, hence co-patenting implies the 
joint ownership of collaborative outcomes (Belderbos et al., 2014). From an economic perspective 
the joint ownership of patents creates, depending on the number of proprietors, a form of duopoly 
or tight oligopoly that appears at first somewhat similar to a restrictive licensing agreement 
(Hagedoorn, 2003). Despite studies (e.g. Reitzig and Wagner, 2010) stress the disadvantages of co-
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patenting, Belderbos et al. (2014) noted that co-ownership of IP remains an empirically relevant 
strategy for companies developing technology jointly. Moreover, Hagedoorn  (2003) provided 
evidence that firms engaged in co-patenting activities in the past are more likely to adopt co-
patenting with subsequent collaborative activities, which suggests that the learning experience of 
effectively arranging and managing co-patents makes firms more likely to employ them in 
subsequent collaborative efforts (Belderbos et al., 2014). In particular, our work draws from the 
results of previous literature which found evidence of the relevance of specific types of partners on 
the propensity to R&D collaboration (Tether, 2002; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003) such as suppliers, 
customers, competitors, universities or research institutes. From a different perspective, Belderbos 
et al. (2014) show that the challenge to appropriate value from sharing IP ownership depends on the 
type of partner involved, firms or universities. Starting from such considerations and trying to 
expand the previous results from a different perspective, in this study we aim to investigate the co-
patenting activities of automakers, which represent our focal firms, according to the type of 
relationship with their co-assignees. Indeed, the choice of the governance mechanisms –from arm’s 
length market transaction to strategic partnerships and ownership– appears to be key in order for 
automakers to access external specialized knowledge while avoiding issues of partner’s 
opportunism, knowledge leakage, and appropriation (Trombini and Zirpoli, 2013). The whole study is 
integrated in the automotive industry which is a typically complex technical environment where the 
cooperation in knowledge creation is very extensive (Lin and Cao, 2012). In particular, large 
automakers proved to be among the most active in co-patenting (Hagedoorn, 2003). More generally 
speaking, the automotive is a technology-driven sector which makes high use of patents in order to 
prevent imitation by competitors. Furthermore, due to the enlargement of the car’s technological 
components (e.g. electronics components) and the rise of new technological trajectories (e.g. the 
«electrification» trend), automakers have been increasingly needing to master a wide variety of 
technological fields in order to stay at the forefront of technological developments (Trombini and 
Zirpoli, 2013). Due to the distinctive features of the context of analysis, which are detailed in section 
three, as anticipated this paper offers an alternative perspective which takes into account the type 
of relationship a firm has established with partners it collaborates for innovation with. In particular, 
we focus on collaborative R&D between the focal firm and their allies, suppliers and subsidiaries: the 
next paragraphs summarize some of the characteristics of such categories which set them as 
potentially relevant for the following analyses. 
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2.2 R&D with allies, suppliers and subsidiaries 
R&D collaborations dealing with a firm's alliance partners are, in many cases, the most 
important source of new ideas and information that result in performance-enhancing technology 
and innovations. Indeed, partners may bring distinctive resources to the alliance, which, when 
combined with the resources of the partner, results in a synergistic effect whereby the combined 
resource endowments are more valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate than they have been before 
they were combined (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Thus, alliance partners can generate rents by 
developing superior inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines, where inter-firm knowledge-sharing 
routine is defined as a regular pattern of inter-firm interactions that permits the transfer, 
recombination, or creation of specialized knowledge (Grant, 1996). Joint R&D is one of the most 
popular reasons for forming alliances in many so-called high-tech industries and emerging technical 
areas (Hagedoorn, 2003). Based on the fact that an alliance is defined as voluntary agreements 
between two or more organizations that unite to pursue a set of agreed-upon goals and remain 
independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance (Rangan and Yoshino, 1996), the choice to 
share property rights may be seen as an important landmark signifying the successful completion of 
inter-firm cooperative R&D and a milestone suggesting future collaboration as the discovery is 
moved toward commercial success (Hagedoorn, 2003). Moreover, seeing the benefits of a long-term 
partnership is crucial for entrepreneurial companies before engaging in risk-taking behavior such as 
the disclosure of sensitive knowledge. Hence, we argue that R&D alliances offer a fertile soil for 
patenting. 
Collaboration with suppliers is highly important in the automotive industry, to the point that 
the success of Japanese automakers has been attributed, amongst other factors, to their close 
supplier relations, with suppliers being closely involved in the innovation process (Harhoff et al. 
2014). For example, Toyota has developed a number of practices that facilitate knowledge transfer 
to and among suppliers with whom it has developed its innovations. However, the fact that vertical 
co-operation is supposed to impact more on the introduction of new products to the market than on 
patenting (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003) suggests that further analyses are required. 
Lastly, firms consider that co-operation within groups involving subsidiaries needs to be 
considered as a separate case (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). Indeed, in this case competitive risks are 
a priori much lower, which may for example be an incentive to co-operate also for relatively small 
firms and to patent. Despite these indications, previous literature in this field (e.g. Tether, 2002;) has 
mainly focused on the propensity of ‘group firms’ versus independent firms to have co-operative 
arrangements for innovation with external partners, rather than on patent sharing between the 
focal firm and its subsidiaries. 
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Previous empirical studies found evidence for a positive effect of R&D collaboration on 
innovation output, often measured in terms of the number of patents, while the characteristics and 
the value or technological relevance of these patents has not been studied to the same extent. The 
literature offers a variety of indicators based on patent bibliometrics to estimate the characteristics 
of the underlying inventions such as the complexity, the technological and geographical scope of the 
protected inventions (e.g. van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe, 2011). In particular, the 
technological importance of the patented invention can be assessed through the number of 
citations received from subsequent patent filings (forward citations). The issue related to patent 
value has received increasing attention since it has been recognized that the economic value of 
patents is skewed and only a small percentage of patents is truly valuable (Scherer and Harhoff, 
2000). However, concerning co-patenting activities, only a few authors have expanded on this topic, 
finding that joint R&D may provide incentives to file patents that are indeed aimed at protecting 
valuable inventions (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2012) and, in any case, the challenge to 
appropriate value from sharing IP ownership depends on the type of partner involved, with 
particular emphasis on intra-industry vs inter-industry dynamics (Belderbos et al., 2014). 
Within this context, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study investigating patterns of 
co-owned patented inventions taking into account the type of relationship between the focal firm 
and its patent co-owners as well as the differences in their innovation output. On such grounds, this 
paper aims to shed light on the following research questions: 
RQ1: Considering the co-owned inventions of the automakers, which are the differences 
among the diverse type of R&D co-assignees (i.e. allied, supplier and subsidiary firms) in terms of 
patent characteristics and value? 
RQ2: Can different co-patenting patterns be identified according to the type of relationship 
between automakers and their R&D partners? 
We refer to the output of joint R&D in terms of patents assigned to more than one company 
as “co-owned/-assigned patented invention” since our unit of analysis is the invention underlying 
the patent documents: the next section provides details on such issue. 
According to the above-presented considerations, we expect that the co-owned patented 
inventions are on average characterized by higher levels of complexity, are more focused on 
technologies out of the core competences of the focal firms and are of a higher level of relevance. 
Concerning the diverse types of relationship with the focal firms, we expect to identify more and of 
higher value co-patented inventions when the R&D partners are allied firms rather than suppliers 
and subsidiaries. 
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3 Methodology 
Our study uses a multi-method approach. On the one hand, there is the need to carry out a 
statistical analysis in order to identify the different characteristics of the examined co-patents in 
terms of technological scope, complexity and technological relevance according to the type of R&D 
partner. On the other hand, a more exploratory approach is needed with the aim to investigate 
patterns of co-patenting between automakers and allies, suppliers and subsidiaries. 
As a consequence, we selected four cases of large automakers which allow to carry out a 
quantitative analysis on a patent-level, as well as a more exploratory analysis on the possible 
patterns of co-patenting at the firm-level. 
 
3.1 Case selection 
Cases were selected based on the following criteria. Firstly, automakers had to be parent 
companies because this allowed to build their corporate tree which was needed in order to identify 
subsidiaries. Secondly, the top countries in terms of motor vehicle production were considered, 
namely U.S., Japan and Germany [2]. In these countries, the top performers are General Motors, 
Toyota and Volkswagen. However, since General Motors could not be included in the sample [3], we 
opted for the second US automaker which is Ford. Due to the smaller size of Ford, we considered 
more appropriate to include in the sample another smaller, though relevant, automaker, which then 
revealed interesting since it contributed to diversify the co-patenting strategies. We opted for the 
second German automaker, which is BMW, so as to have two European and two non-European 
companies. Table 1 shows the main features of the selected cases. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
3.2 Data collection 
We collected two sets of data for the four selected automakers from two proprietary 
databases, Capital IQ (CIQ) and Thomson Innovation (TI) [4]. We then matched the collected 
information by exploiting the fact that focusing on a relatively small sample of companies allows a 
more detailed check of the data, in particular on firm names. Figure 1 summarizes the data 
collection and matching process which is described in the next paragraphs. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
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From CIQ we retrieved the inter-firm relationships in the groups of allied, supplier and 
subsidiary companies, for a total of around 4,400 relationship pairs [5]. From TI we derived the 
automakers’ patent portfolios at the European Patent Office (EPO) and the names of the co-
assignees. The focus on the EPO is motivated by reasons of data uniformity, integrity and reliability, 
as suggested also by Belderbos et al. (2014). Moreover the EPO is a regional office so it should suffer 
less from the domestic effect of applicants filing their invention more often in the country of their 
headquarters (Criscuolo, 2006). We collected all the EPO filings with earliest priority year from 2004. 
The choice of the priority date as reference is consistent with the analysis based on inventions 
rather than patents since it is the closest to the invention date. The process generated a total of 
13,576 patent documents. 
With the aim to avoid the double-counting of the patent protected inventions and to 
consider the invention described in the application document and in all the corresponding 
subsequent published patent documents (e.g. search report, grant, potential amendments) as a 
single unit of analysis, the retrieved documents were collapsed on the application number itself, 
operatively by grouping the records on the publication number and excluding the publication kind 
code. Such procedure determined the measurement of the inventive activity with a more accurate 
proxy than the count of patent documents. 
The final collected records correspond to 8,041 inventions and the total share of co-assigned 
patented inventions is 17.5%: Table 2 provides details for each automaker. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The process of matching the two different data sources started from the standardization of 
the company names, in order to keep note of spelling mistakes, of historical brand changes and of 
mergers and acquisitions whenever possible. Such task was accomplished by analyzing all the names 
of the identified patent co-assignees (about 2,000) at first by applying an automated algorithm for 
grouping similar names which served to overcome spelling variations and department specificities 
mainly. Then, we manually checked the results by comparing and, when needed, integrating them 
with internet searches on the official company websites and with companies’ corporate tree 
available in CIQ. The procedure ended up with 529 different assignee names [6]. 
The final procedural step is constituted by the matching between the standardized assignee 
names from TI and the company names retrieved from CIQ as allied, supplier and subsidiary firms of 
the selected automakers. A total of 121 assignee names (23% of the standardized company assignee 
names) were matched to CIQ lists. 
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3.3 Statistical model 
The econometric analysis consists of two models aiming at identifying the differences and 
commonalities across the automakers’ portfolios of co-owned patented inventions: i) a set of probit 
models on the co-assignment likelihood to highlight the presence of differences between single-
owned inventions and those output of the identified types of R&D collaboration partners; ii) a 
maximum likelihood treatment-effects model to ascertain the technological relevance level, 
measured by patent citations, of the inventions generated collaborating with allies, suppliers and 
subsidiaries. 
The first group of econometric tests investigates the patent-level characteristics of the co-
assigned inventions through a probit model on the co-assignment likelihood. The dependent 
variables of the probit models are dummies for the co-assignment, equal to 1 when the invention is 
owned by more than one firm, and for the co-assignment with each of the specific types of 
relationship (i.e. ally, supplier and subsidiary). They describe the differences between single-owned 
and co-assigned R&D output at the level of invention characteristics. 
In line with existing literature (van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe, 2011), we employed 
the available patent bibliometric indicators as independent variables which serve as proxies for 
complexity (number of backward patent citations and number of inventors) and technological scope 
(number of diverse International Patent Classification codes at four digit level or IPC subclasses) [7]. 
In addition to the latter indicator which provides information on how many different technical fields 
the invention is associated with, we computed a dummy variable equal to 1 when the patented 
invention reports specific IPC codes related to the main technology fields of activity of the 
corresponding automaker. To do so, we identified the core technologies in each automaker from the 
analysis of the most representative IPC classes associated to the single-owned inventions in each 
company’s portfolio [8]. As a robustness check, we controlled for automakers and years dummies. 
The second econometric analysis builds upon the findings of the previous probit tests to 
estimate, through a treatment-effects model, the presence of differences in the technological value 
of the co-assigned patented inventions according to the type of relationships with the R&D partner. 
Indeed, previous literature found a positive correlation between some of the bibliometric 
characteristics and the patent value (e.g.van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe, 2011). The maximum 
likelihood treatment-effects model (Wooldridge, 2002) considers the effect of an endogenously 
chosen binary treatment, in this case the invention co-assignment rather than being a single owner, 
on another endogenous continuous variable, here the technological relevance of the invention, 
conditional on two sets of independent variables. The technological importance is proxied by the 
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number of forward citations, weighted in order to keep consideration of the filing age. The 
treatment equation replicates the previous probit model while the second stage equation includes 
the dummies for the relationship types with the co-assignees (i.e. ally, supplier, and subsidiary 
firms). 
 
4 Data analysis and results 
The presentation of the data analysis and results makes use of a set of econometric models 
to capture the differences across the type of partners in terms of characteristics and value of the co-
owned patented inventions and of a combination of illustrative examples and tables describing the 
data from which inferences were drawn (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
The first step of the analyses aims to ascertain the presence of differences in the R&D 
collaboration output with respect to single-owned inventions and when considering each of the 
different types of relationship. We applied a set probit models on the patented invention portfolios 
of the selected automakers: model (1) tests the different characteristics of the patented inventions 
between the co-owned and single-owned ones; models from (2) to (5) test the likelihood of a co-
assignment respectively with an ally, a supplier and a subsidiary. Each model includes a set of patent 
bibliometrics as independent variables, controlling for automakers and years dummies. Such ex-ante 
variables characterize the filed inventions and the corresponding results are shown in Table 3. On 
average, the co-assigned inventions are associated to a higher number of backward citations 
(BWDCIT), of inventors (INVENTORS) and of IPC subclasses, proxy of the technological scope 
(TECHSCOPE); co-owned inventions are also associated more often to IPC classes out of the 
company core technologies (CORETECH) than single-owned ones. Such results are in line with 
Belderbos et al. (2014) but for the technology diversification which is found positive and significant 
in our data sample [9]. When considering the type of relationship with the co-assignees, it emerges 
that in all cases the number of inventors is higher, consistently with model (1). The other variables 
differ according to the type of relationship considered in the econometric analysis. The inventions 
jointly patented with allied firms do not report significant differences but for a wider TECHSCOPE, 
although only at 10% level. The inventions co-patented with subsidiary firms have on average a 
wider TECHSCOPE and cover less frequently the technologies considered core for the focal firms. 
The inventions co-owned with suppliers report a higher level of complexity (higher INVENTORS and 
BWDCIT). Finally the inventions jointly assigned with firms not characterized by an identified formal 
relationship are on average more complex and more often on technologies out of the core portfolio 
of the focal firms. 
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[Table 3 here] 
 
The results suggest the presence of diversities in the type of inventions co-owned with the 
different type of partners. In order to further investigate the presence of ex-post differences in the 
value of the inventions, we performed a second econometric model which takes into account the 
role of the different types of relationship on the technological value of the patented inventions: the 
proxy variable is the number of forward citations (FWDCIT). The treatment effect model is 
computed on the subset of inventions until 2009 in order to limit the censorship effect connected to 
the forward citations variable for a total of 6,229 observations. Table 4 shows the coefficients and 
the standard errors of the equation for treatment effects in column (2), where the dummy for being 
a co-assigned invention is the dependent variable, and the general model in column (1) where the 
regression on the dependent variable FWDCIT takes into account the “treatment”, i.e. the co-
assignment [10]. 
The results in column (2) are consistent with the previous probit model on the full sample 
with no time limits, as expected. Focusing on the main equation in column (1) and on the dummies 
for the relationship types, the presence of a subsidiary or supplier company as assignee is 
significantly and positively associated to the number of received citations, while the presence of an 
allied firm among the co-assignees has no significant (but negative) coefficient. Also the presence of 
a co-assignee with non-formalized partnership is positively related to the proxy of technological 
relevance. The other variables describing the patented invention characteristics through 
bibliometrics (i.e., BWDCIT, INVENTORS and TECHSCOPE) have significant positive coefficients. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Since the econometric analyses identified the presence of differences in the characteristics 
and value of co-patented inventions in relation to the type of partners, we performed a more 
detailed comparison of the data regarding the selected automakers both at a firm- and patent-level, 
in order to understand their patterns of co-patenting. 
The size of the four selected automakers measured in terms sales is mirrored by the size of 
their invention portfolios. Indeed, TTA counts a number of inventions which is four times the 
number of inventions of BMW. Moreover, the four automakers present differences in the number of 
co-assignees involved in the patenting activities and in the share of co-assigned inventions on the 
total portfolio: such differences point in the direction of various levels of innovation openness. Table 
5 shows that TTA has a number of co-assignees largely higher than the other automakers, suggesting 
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a higher propensity to co-patenting. However, the average number of inventions per co-assignee is 
in line with FRD which has the lowest number of different co-assignees. This indicates that TTA does 
not concentrate many co-owned patented inventions with the same co-assignee, which is supported 
by the value of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) which describes the concentration of co-
owned patented inventions with single co-assignees. The indicator CR4, a more direct measure of 
concentration, shows the share of co-assigned inventions owned by the first four co-assignees on 
the total co-assigned patented inventions: the first four co-assignees of BMW own the 73% of all the 
co-owned patented inventions in BMW’s portfolio, while in the case of TTA, the top four own the 
36% of co-assigned inventions; FRD and VLW report lower values, between 51 and 59%. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the patented invention assignments in each automaker’s 
portfolio distinguishing by the single-owned and the co-assigned inventions; co-assigned inventions 
can be, in turn, divided into those co-assigned with a company identified as one among the 
relationship types (allied, supplier or subsidiary) and those co-assigned with other partners with no 
identified relationships. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The analysis of the data from Table 5 and Figure 2 suggests a certain heterogeneity across 
the examined automakers. The propensity to co-patenting is high both in terms of diverse involved 
partners and of share of co-assigned patented inventions on total portfolio for BMW and TTA, but 
the former seems to focus on a small group of partners, which absorb the largest part of the co-
assigned inventions, and reports a long tail of occasional collaborations. On the contrary the figures 
for TTA show that co-assignments are relatively less concentrated and involve a higher number of 
partners. Values of propensity to co-patenting for VLW are similar to BMW and TTA at the invention-
level, but the number of partners is much lower; however the concentration indexes suggest a 
middle position for VLW between the situation of BMW and of TTA. Quite different is the case of 
FRD: it shows a low propensity to co-patenting, both in terms of number of partners and of share of 
co-assigned inventions, and middle concentration levels. 
Table 6 reports the main statistics on the co-patenting activities of the selected automakers 
by distinguishing on firm- and invention-level analyses, respectively in terms of percentage on total 
co-assignees and on total co-assigned inventions. In order to understand the values, it is necessary 
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to note that not only a company might be considered an allied, a supplier and a subsidiary at the 
same time in CIQ, but also an invention might be co-owned by several firms in any of the three 
identified types. As a consequence, we took into consideration also the overlapping among 
categories (i.e., allies, suppliers and subsidiaries): thus, the sum of the items 2.a 2.b and 2.c might 
exceed the corresponding aggregate value in item 2. 
Focusing on the firm-level analysis related to the percentage of allies, suppliers and 
subsidiaries as co-owners on total co-assignees in Table 6, we can appreciate that, despite a 
common tendency towards co-patenting with suppliers, automakers follow different patterns in co-
patenting with other R&D partners. Particularly, BMW registers the highest values for allies as co-
assignees, whilst the lowest for subsidiaries. In contrast, FRD shows an opposite approach, favoring 
suppliers as R&D partners for co-patenting rather than allies. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
The invention-level analysis, that is the percentage on total co-assigned inventions in Table 
6Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., shows different values. For BMW and FRD, the 
share of patents co-owned with subsidiaries is very limited, preferring allies rather than suppliers. 
On the contrary, VLW co-own patents firstly with suppliers and then with subsidiaries, while co-
assigned inventions with allies are not a relevant part of co-assignees inventions. Similarly, TTA 
privilege co-assignments with suppliers but the share of co-assignments with allies exceeds those 
with subsidiaries. 
Comparing the shares of co-patenting on firm- and invention-level, the first general 
evidence is that on average only about one third of the automakers’ co-assignees are among those 
with a formalized relationship, but they are responsible for around two thirds of the total co-
assigned inventions. The data suggest that the non-formalized collaborations can be considered as 
occasional, supporting the fitness of the identified relationships as representative of the co-
patenting activities. 
The analysis of the formalized relationship types shows that the four automakers seem to 
follow different patterns. The co-assignees of BMW are mainly allied and suppliers but most of the 
co-assigned patented inventions are with the former; subsidiaries are not involved in the co-
patenting activities of BMW. The case of FRD, characterized by a relatively small pool of co-
assignees, is similar to the previous but the role of the allied firms is more relevant because one of 
them is responsible for almost one third of the co-patenting activity. The figures of TTA reflect the 
tight relations with the suppliers, which are often also subsidiary or partners in formalized alliances, 
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and the propensity to invest in co-patenting activities also through non-formalized relationships; 
hence, on the one side the share of inventions co-assigned with non-formalized partners is the 
highest (40%) among the four automakers and on the other side all the co-assignees with any 
relationship type have a significant share of joint inventions (in particular a small number of allies is 
responsible for circa one third of the co-patenting activities and around 43% of the inventions are 
co-assigned with suppliers which is the most frequent type of relationship). VLW seems to differ 
from all the previous cases by involving allied companies in a more limited way: moreover, the only 
allies which co-own patents with VLW are also suppliers and/or subsidiaries; the largest share (42%) 
of co-inventions is with two companies that are both suppliers and subsidiaries. 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
Relying on both descriptive and econometric analysis, this paper explores the patterns of co-
patenting between an automaker and its allies, suppliers and subsidiaries, with a twofold aim: firstly, 
to understand whether patented inventions co-owned with R&D partners having different 
relationships with the focal firm may be more or less valuable; secondly, to unveil the presence of 
different co-patenting patterns among the selected companies. Our findings provide a better 
understanding of the strategic decisions concerning the management of R&D collaborations and of 
the associated IP ownership within an open innovation context as it is the one considered in the 
automotive industry. 
The differences across the relationship types emerge when performing analyses on the 
patented invention level both on the characteristics and the effective technological value of the 
collaboration output. The general comparison between single-owned and co-assigned inventions is 
in line with previous results (e.g., Belderbos et al, 2014): on average co-owned inventions are 
characterized by larger team of inventors, a higher complexity, a wider scope and are more often in 
technological fields where the focal firm has less expertise. However, the analyses of the 
characteristics of the co-assigned inventions highlight the presence of differences related to the type 
of involved partners: Table 7 summarizes the results for the analyzed relationship types. The R&D 
collaboration with allied firms generate on average inventions which are not so different from the 
others in the focal firm’s portfolio but they might be sometimes technologically diversified. 
Concerning the suppliers, the co-owned inventions are particularly complex but are not significantly 
diverse in terms of scope and proximity to focal firms core technologies. The innovative output from 
the partnership with subsidiaries is on average characterized by inventions significantly diversified 
and out of the company focus. Finally all those non-formalized collaborations generate inventions 
which are more complex and focused in other fields. 
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[Table 7 here] 
 
The results of the second econometric model suggest that the technological relevance is not 
the same across the co-assigned inventions when distinguishing by the type of relationship with the 
R&D partner: the results point to a higher value of patented inventions for suppliers and subsidiaries 
while a collaboration with allies is not associated to an improvement in the average technological 
relevance. This evidence indicates that firms are able to generate more valuable innovations 
collaborating with partners with a tighter relationship correspondent either to the direct ownership 
or the existence of a solid supply contract, which is driven by the lower a priori risk of disclosing 
technologies and revealing competences. The examined firms might have found difficulties in the 
R&D collaboration process with allied partners, failing from achieving innovations with a higher than 
average value with respect to the focal firm’s portfolio as a whole. An additional explanation might 
concern the fact that the co-owned patent may represent an important landmark in the R&D 
alliance (Hagedoorn, 2003) and signifies its successful completion or even a specific contract 
milestone included in the contract to ease the technology management as a whole. In other 
circumstances, sole ownership of the co-developed knowledge might not be feasible since the 
partner may well be unwilling to relinquish control, forcing partners to co-own the technology; 
hence, collaboration and IP sharing may be the only route to successful invention (Belderbos et al., 
2014). In these situations, the companies might file patent applications with no particular interest in 
their actual value. 
These findings confirm that the choice of the governance mechanisms appears to be key in 
order for automakers to access external specialized knowledge while avoiding issues of partner’s 
opportunism, knowledge leakage, and appropriability (Trombini and Zirpoli, 2013). Furthermore, 
when the R&D collaboration involves allied firms at arm’s length and there is a misalignment 
between the characteristics of the transacted technology and the contract complexity, the ability to 
generate value within alliances may be reduced, as discussed in Sampson (2004) and Anderson and 
Dekker (2005). 
The combination of results emerging from both the quantitative analysis on a patent-level 
and qualitative analysis on a firm-level show that there seem to be different co-patenting patterns 
connected to the company propensity to resort to co-assignments as output of R&D collaborations 
and in terms of preferences on one relationship type (allies, suppliers or subsidiaries). According to 
the analyses, we define four main patterns, named contingent, purposive, watchful, extensive, which 
are also represented in Figure 3Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.. 
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[Figure 3 here] 
 
Contingent pattern is associated to automakers with a relatively low co-patenting propensity 
and with a preference for one relationship type which absorbs the largest part of the co-assigned 
inventions. It is case of the establishment of a specific R&D collaboration in response to an emerging 
need which the company might find particularly difficult to satisfy with its internal competences: the 
R&D collaboration output is concentrated through a very small number of partners and might be 
considered as an exception to the usual occasional approach. Among the cases we analyzed, FRD 
seems to adopt a contingent strategy. The largest part of FRD’s co-patented inventions is 
represented by jointly assignments with the allied company Daimler AG, regarding the R&D 
collaboration on the fuel cell technology which was also supported by the creation of the joint 
venture “Automotive Fuel Cell Cooperation”. As discussed above, the patenting of a co-invention 
may represent the “seal” to the collaboration or the result of the impossibility to divide the 
innovation into two different patents due to the complexity of the technology containing know-how 
of both partners. Moreover, with respect to the other examined automakers, the focal firm shows 
less propensity to co-patenting, suggesting that it might be less inclined to collaborations, a part 
from those situations which bring a relevant advantage to its business. This is typical of firms 
engaging in occasional collaborations for specific projects. 
Purposive and watchful strategies identify automakers with a relatively high propensity to 
co-patenting. They are characterized by non-negligible amounts of co-assigned inventions with all 
the three types of partners but some of them clearly absorb the largest share of co-patenting 
activities. We distinguish between the focus on allied co-assignees for the purposive approach and 
on subsidiaries and suppliers for the watchful one. Similar to the contingent strategy, the purposive 
one shows a preference for co-patenting with a relatively small group of allies. In addition to 
average R&D collaboration rates with the supplier and subsidiary firms, the focal firm shares the 
patent ownership of a high number of inventions with few allied partners on specific research 
projects. This is the pattern of BMW which, among the other R&D collaborations, was particularly 
involved in the development of a number of inventions with General Motors, Chrysler and Daimler 
on a set of hybrid vehicle technologies in the so called “Global Hybrid Cooperation” from 2005 
(Dawid et al, 2013). Here, the focal firm seems to show a more regular pattern of collaborations for 
specific purposes and is more used to co-patenting which appears considered as a more 
consolidated practice for innovative activities with allies disregarding the effective value of the 
results. 
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The relationships with suppliers and subsidiaries should suffer less from the risks of 
unintended knowledge leakage or undesired licensing agreements since, in addition to the IP rights 
of the co-owned invention, the focal firm may exerts its controlling role and the threat of changes in 
the supply contract, nonetheless operating in a more familiar environment. The watchful strategy of 
automakers with a relatively high propensity to co-patenting activities with suppliers and 
subsidiaries suggests a more cautious approach in the choice of partnerships when disclosing 
competences and in the appropriation regimes when developing new technologies. The data 
analysis exhibits that, despite being the automaker with the smallest patent portfolio, VLW shows a 
high co-patenting level; the two largest co-assignees of VLW are Audi AG and Hella KG Hueck, 
respectively key subsidiary and supplier, assure to maintain in-house technological and engineering 
capabilities. Having a tighter control on their R&D partners, focal firms may invest more in co-
patents since they are aware their efforts remain within the company or they may exert their 
control power over co-assignees. Moreover, the collaboration with suppliers is beneficial for product 
innovation because of the combination of complementary capabilities and the common goals 
between firm and suppliers (Santamaria and Surroca, 2011), but also suppliers provide critical 
contribution for developing more disruptive inventions (Nieto and Santamaria, 2010), which claim 
for more valuable co-patents. 
The extensive strategy is associated to automakers with a significant propensity to co-
patenting, thus to open innovation practices. This category is characterized by a large number of co-
assignees distributed across all the relationship types. TTA seems to be the automaker having the 
most multifaceted co-patenting strategy: the share of co-patenting in its portfolio is very high and all 
types of R&D partners it co-owns patented inventions with are significantly involved. Anyway, 
suppliers play the predominant role in line with the general approach of TTA towards them, closely 
involved in the innovation process (Harhoff et al., 2014) and with the characteristics typical of the 
Japanese keiretsu group structure. The environment in which TTA operates and collaborates is 
protected also by a particular overlapping of relationship types with the co-assignees, suggesting 
that TTA is attentive to safeguard itself with additional clauses. By way of example, the largest R&D 
partners of TTA in terms of co-assigned inventions are Denso Corp., Aisin and Toyota Industries Corp 
which are direct suppliers and companies with direct or indirect ownership ties with the Toyota 
Group. These evidences support and enrich previous findings: indeed, on the one hand, a more 
attentive approach towards co-patenting on the part of firms which are more inclined towards 
collaboration is confirmed; on the other hand, TTA completes its noticeable co-patenting with 
suppliers and subsidiaries with a relevant number of co-patents with allies for purposeful 
collaborations. 
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5.1 Theoretical and managerial implications 
The present study reveals useful insights both for the academic community and managers. 
As far as the theoretical implications are concerned, our study has made several contributions to the 
study of R&D collaborations and co-patenting literature. First, it presents an alternative approach for 
investigating co-patenting with partners having different types of relationships, providing a more 
fine-grained distinction among different types of partner. Compared with some similar studies (e.g., 
Tether, 2002; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Belderbos et al., 2014), our findings examine the co-
patenting strategies between automakers and its allies, suppliers and subsidiaries, since the initial 
contractual design of technology partnerships can have important value-creation implications (e.g., 
Sampson, 2004; Faems et al., 2005). Second, the study explores the value of co-owned patented 
inventions depending on the type of relationships the focal firm has with its R&D partners, thus 
responding to an explicit call for research investigating if, and to which extent, R&D policies such as 
direct subsidies for R&D collaboration, for instance, play a role in driving either kind of collaborative 
activity as well as the effects on patenting both in terms of quality and quantity (Hottenrott and 
Lopes-Bento, 2012). Third, the combination of two different databases which allow to integrate 
patent data with information about the governance mechanism is particularly valuable from a 
methodological point of view, as well as the use of inventions instead of patents. 
Last, since the co-patenting activities provide an indication of R&D collaboration and thus of 
the degree of open innovation, this paper contributed to the enlargement of the corresponding 
literature, which continues to be one of the hottest topics in innovation management (Huizingh, 
2011). In particular, our results prove that the patenting dynamics should consider the correlation 
between the type of partner and the characteristics and value of innovation. This means that the 
type of partner a firm co-develop a patent with may be associated, on average, to an indication on 
the value of that patent, and, hence, co-patenting with different types of partners is likely to 
produce a different output in terms of patent quality. As a consequence, research on open 
innovation should pay particular attention towards the subject of open innovation and the involved 
partners when co-patenting becomes a relevant element of collaboration. 
In addition, our findings provide some important implications for managers concerned with 
IP ownership. In particular, it offers useful insights concerning the different strategies a firm may 
pursue in order to share IP with its different R&D partners, as well as a possible trajectory in order to 
improve their co-patenting strategy. More specifically, if the patenting is driven mostly by the need 
to fulfill the R&D agreements with an allied partner, that is to be a milestone or only to have a 
signaling aim, the focal firm should question the amount of resources actually needed to file and 
 20 
 
maintain the output patents over time in accordance with the real value of the protected innovation 
and pay particular attention towards ex-ante negotiations on co-patenting arrangements. The 
collaboration contract should be drafted by evaluating the best suited output: patents might help to 
delimit the boundaries of the collaborative output and then its management (eventually its 
transaction). Instead, our evidence suggests that when a focal firm co-develops complex and 
technologically broader inventions jointly with suppliers and subsidiaries, that is in a less risky more 
known environment characterized by additional ties between the focal firm and the R&D partner, 
the likely higher patent value legitimizes a stronger effort for filing and maintaining patents. Based 
on these evidences, focal firms might benefit from investing resources in thoroughly scouting 
potential R&D partners among their suppliers and subsidiaries. If a focal firm is able to manage both 
purposive co-patenting with allied firms for very specific types of innovation, finding the right 
balance between investments and benefits from co-patenting, and more valuable patenting activity, 
to which making a higher effort, with suppliers and subsidiaries, then it can walk the path through 
an extensive co-patenting strategy. 
Moreover, considered that results related to the technological relevance of co-owned 
patented inventions suggest that focal firms co-develop inventions which are more complex and in 
technological domains where the focal firm has less expertise, they could be used commercially in 
order to enhance their reputation, thus making the most of their co-patenting activity. 
. 
 
5.2 Limitations and opportunities for future research 
We acknowledge that our study has several limitations. One of which is that the empirical 
results are derived from four automakers which have been considered as exemplars of different 
strategies concerning the appropriation of the results of co-innovation. Future studies could 
investigate this issue for more cases in the automotive sector, as well as in different industries, in 
order to extend the generalization of the findings and test the taxonomy proposed for co-patenting 
strategies through alternative methodologies. Moreover, this is an exploratory study based only on 
secondary data. For this reason, primary data collected directly from companies, but always related 
to co-patents as the output of collaboration with external partners for innovation, could reveal 
significant supporting insights. Further, we did not discriminate among the different alliance forms, 
which could represent another possible extension of our study. In addition, some more interesting 
issues such as the consequences, for example from a financial and economic perspective, of the 
adoption of different co-patenting strategies could be explored in future research. 
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7 Notes 
[1] This is an important caveat with the analysis as Belderbos et al. (2014) pointed out. Co-
patents as unit of analysis combine information on R&D collaboration and its IP sharing 
arrangement. In order to examine the implications of IP sharing per se, we would need to identify 
patents that are the result of collaborative R&D but are owned by a single firm: such piece of 
information is not readily available. 
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[2] China is one of the most relevant countries concerning the automotive industries, 
however, information on names of Chinese companies, in terms of corporate structure and patent 
assignments with the company names, are not complete and clear, thus we deliberately decided not 
to consider them. 
[3] In 2009 General Motors went through the Chapter 11 re-organization which could have 
caused problems in the process of identifying subsidiaries before and after that year, as well as in 
the matching with assignee names (see Data collection for further details about this issue). 
[4] All data were accessed in October 2013. 
[5] Some of the identified partner firms are listed with two of the three or with all the three 
statuses at the same time. Additional information on the data collection process are available on 
request. 
[6] Individual assignees were excluded from the standardization process and the analyses. 
[7] All the patent bibliometric variables are log transformed. 
[8] The 3 digit IPC codes which are considered core technology fields are those singularly 
associated to at least the 10% of the portfolio of single-owned inventions. In aggregate they 
represent from 75 to 83% of the total invention portfolio. They are listed in Table 7 in the appendix. 
[9] The variable used in Belderbos et al. (2014) counts the number of IPC classes (3 digit 
codes) while we consider subclasses (4 digit codes). 
[10] Equation (1) does not include the variable “CORETECH” and the “Automakers dummies” 
because, ex ante, there is no reason to expect that the technological importance of an invention 
should be related to one owner rather than another and to the centrality of the invention in a 
company technology portfolio. 
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8 Appendix 
 
[Table 8 here] 
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Tables 
Table 1. Main features of the selected cases (data from CIQ). 
Automaker 
Ac
ronym 
Year of 
foundation 
HQ 
Country 
Total 
revenues 
2012 [M€] 
Bayerische Motoren 
Werke AG 
B
MW 
1916 
Ger
many 
76.848 
Ford Motor Co. 
FR
D 
1903 
Unit
ed States 
101.823 
Toyota Motor Co. 
TT
A 
1933 
Japa
n 
192.295 
Volkswagen AG 
VL
W 
1937 
Ger
many 
192.676 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics regarding patents.  
Automaker
s 
EPO 
patents 
(priority 
year>=2004) 
Pa
tented 
inventions 
Number of 
single-owned 
patented inventions 
Percentage of 
co-owned 
patented inventions 
BMW 2,116 
1,2
48 
1,012 18.9% 
FRD 1,459 
91
2 
821 10.0% 
TTA 8,808 
5,1
31 
4,174 18.7% 
VLW 1,193 
75
1 
627 16.5% 
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Table 3. Probit model (1) on co-assignment event and probit models (from 2 to 5) on the 
type of 
partnership. All with robust standard errors (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10). Note: 
BWDCIT = number 
of backward citations; INVENTORS = number of inventors; TECHSCOPE = technological 
scope; 
CORETECH = core technologies 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
Co-
assignment 
Allie
d 
co-assignee 
Supplier 
co-assignee 
Subsidia
ry 
co-assignee 
Non-
formalized 
relation 
      
BWDCIT 0.076
*** 
0.045 0.092*** 0.023 0.078*** 
 (0.02
3) 
(0.03
0) 
(0.030) (0.036) (0.029) 
INVENTOR
S 
0.923
*** 
0.575
*** 
0.697*** 0.662*** 0.746*** 
 (0.03
1) 
(0.03
7) 
(0.037) (0.049) (0.037) 
TECHSCOP
E 
0.080
** 
0.085
* 
-0.047 0.242*** -0.059 
 (0.03
7) 
(0.04
8) 
(0.048) (0.058) (0.050) 
CORETECH -
0.293*** 
-
0.054 
-0.019 -
0.253*** 
-0.305*** 
 (0.04
2) 
(0.05
6) 
(0.054) (0.063) (0.053) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Automakers 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -
2.212*** 
-
3.134*** 
-
2.330*** 
-
1.994*** 
-2.298*** 
 (0.34
8) 
(0.51
1) 
(0.479) (0.505) (0.369) 
      
Observations 8,041 8,041 8,041 8,041 8,041 
PseudoR2 0.176 0.127 0.141 0.171 0.136 
Loglikelihoo
d 
-
3072.973 
-
1679.274 
-
1705.164 
-
1094.457 
-1693.117 
Chi2 1059.
542 
386.3
99 
560.250 270.230 490.448 
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Table 4. Treatment effect model on weighted forward citations. Equation for treatment 
effects in column 
(2) with “co-assigned invention” dummy as treatment; sample of inventions limited from 
2004 to 2009; 
standard robust errors in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10). Note: BWDCIT = 
number of 
backward citations; INVENTORS = number of inventors; TECHSCOPE = technological 
scope; 
CORETECH = core technologies 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FWDCIT Co-assigned 
invention 
   
Allied co-
assignee 
-0.055  
 (0.055)  
Supplier co-
assignee 
0.173***  
 (0.048)  
Subsidiary co-
assignee 
0.161***  
 (0.061)  
Non-formalized 
relat. 
0.179***  
 (0.069)  
BWDCIT 0.138*** 0.064** 
 (0.010) (0.025) 
INVENTOR 0.055*** 0.923*** 
 (0.014) (0.035) 
TECHSCOPE 0.131*** 0.090** 
 (0.017) (0.041) 
CORETECH  -0.292*** 
  (0.048) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Automakers 
dummies 
 Yes 
Constant 0.061** -2.031*** 
 (0.025) (0.103) 
   
athrho 0.153***  
 (0.049)  
lnsigma -0.433***  
 (0.009)  
Observations 6,229 6,229 
Loglikelihood -8567.947  
Chi2 347.638  
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Table 5. Statistics on co-assignments and concentration of co-patenting activities. Note: 
HHI = 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index; CR4 = share of co-assigned inventions owned by the first 
four co-assignees 
on the total co-assigned patented inventions 
A
utomakers 
Number of 
different 
co-assignees 
Average 
number 
of inventions 
per coassignee 
Concentration of co-
patenting activities 
   [HHI] 
[CR
4] 
B
MW 
91 2.59 0.17 73% 
F
RD 
25 3.64 0.16 59% 
T
TA 
243 3.94 0.04 36% 
V
LW 
46 2.70 0.13 51% 
 
Table 6 Co-patenting by type of relationship (non-formalized, formalized and details on 
allied, supplier and subsidiaries co-assignees). 
Auto
makers 
Relationship type % on total 
co-assignees 
% on total 
co-assigned inventions 
BM
W 
1.Non-formalized 70.4% 31.4% 
 2.Any formalized 
relationship 
29.6% 68.6% 
 2.a Allied 15.4% 59.3% 
 2.b Suppliers 19.8% 14.8% 
 2.c Subsidiaries 1.1% 0.4% 
FRD 1.Non-formalized 64.0% 38.5% 
 2.Any formalized 
relationship 
36.0% 61.5% 
 2.a Allied 4.0% 36.3% 
 2.b Suppliers 20.0% 15.4% 
 2.c Subsidiaries 12.0% 9.9% 
TTA 1.Non-formalized 81.9% 40.1% 
 2.Any formalized 
relationship 
18.1% 59.9% 
 2.a Allied 6.2% 35.1% 
 2.b Suppliers 12.3% 42.8% 
 2.c Subsidiaries 4.5% 25.7% 
VLW 1.Non-formalized 65.2% 31.5% 
 2.Any formalized 
relationship 
32.6% 67.7% 
 2.a Allied 8.7% 8.1% 
 2.b Suppliers 26.1% 66.9% 
 2.c Subsidiaries 10.9% 45.2% 
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Table 7. Summary of the results of the econometric analyses. Characteristics of the 
examined co-owned inventions when the co-assignee is an allied, a supplier or a subsidiary firm 
with respect to the rest of the total sample 
Characteri
stics of the 
co-owned inventions 
Allied 
firms 
Supplier 
firms 
Subsidiar
y firms 
Complexity 
 
+ 
more 
complex 
 
Technology 
scope 
+ 
wider 
scope 
 
+ 
wider 
scope 
Core to the 
focal firm   
- 
more 
peripheral 
Value 
 
+ 
higher 
+ 
higher 
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Table 8 Most frequent IPC classes in the portfolio of single-owned inventions 
Aut
omaker 
IP
C Class 
Description 
S
hare 
B
MW 
B
60 
vehicles in general 
3
9.8% 
 
B
62 
land vehicles for travelling otherwise than on 
rails 
1
6.4% 
 
F
02 
combustion engines; hot-gas or combustion-
product engine plants 
1
2.9% 
 
F
16 
engineering elements or units; general 
measures for producing and maintaining effective 
functioning of machines or installations; thermal 
insulation in general 
1
2.5% 
 
F
01 
machines or engines in general; engine plants 
in general; steam engines 
1
0.3% 
FR
D 
B
60 
vehicles in general 
3
6.3% 
 
F
02 
combustion engines; hot-gas or combustion-
product engine plants 
2
9.4% 
 
F
01 
machines or engines in general; engine plants 
in general; steam engines 
1
8.1% 
 
B
62 
land vehicles for travelling otherwise than on 
rails 
1
0.7% 
 
F
16 
engineering elements or units; general 
measures for producing and maintaining effective 
functioning of machines or installations; thermal 
insulation in general 
1
0.6% 
TT
A 
B
60 
vehicles in general 
3
1.2% 
 
F
02 
combustion engines; hot-gas or combustion-
product engine plants 
3
0.4% 
 
F
01 
machines or engines in general; engine plants 
in general; steam engines 
1
8.2% 
 
H
01 
basic electric elements 
1
4.4% 
VL
W 
B
60 
vehicles in general 
5
0.9% 
 
F
02 
combustion engines; hot-gas or combustion-
product engine plants 
1
5.8% 
 
G
06 
computing; calculating; counting 
1
2.8% 
 
F
16 
engineering elements or units; general 
measures for producing and maintaining effective 
functioning of machines or installations; thermal 
insulation in general 
1
1.2% 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Scheme of the data collection and matching process 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of inventions owned by each automaker alone, co-assigned with a partner 
identified through one of the relationship types (ally, supplier subsidiary) or with non-formalized 
relationship 
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Figure 3. Scheme of categories for co-patenting patterns according to the most frequent 
relationship types with the co-assignees 
 
 
 
